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Fightback Strategies 
Whose Job Is It, 
Anyway? 
Capital Strategies for Labor 
• Randy Barber 
When corporate mergers and takeovers create massively debt-
ridden new entities, with the resulting pressures to sell off assets, 
reduce costs (especially wages) and close "marginal" operations, 
it is the company's workers and their communities who suffer. 
And, when corporate managers accept, and even encourage, huge 
levels of waste, or ignore obvious opportunities because they aren't 
profitable enough, workers and their communities end up paying 
for the resulting inefficiencies and lost potential. 
I believe that a hallmark of the new economic era we seem to 
be entering will be that workers and unions will be forced to 
actively concern themselves with all aspects of an employer's 
business—with the intricate details of corporate structure, finance, 
and operations. In the process, they will have to evolve a 
comprehensive approach to the process of production and distribu-
tion, to investment and financial issues, as well as to corporate 
organization and control. In short, they will need to begin learning 
• Randy Barber is director of the Center for Economic Organizing in Washington, 
D.C., and has advised dozens of unions on their capital strategies. Barber notes: 
"I have borrowed ideas from far too many people to mention here. Most 
particuiarJy, however, I want to acknowledge my debt to the members, jointiy 
and individuaiiy, of the Capital Strategies Working Group." 
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how to organize economic resources themselves and evolve what 
have been called capital strategies. 
A Prologue from the Past 
Take a moment to reflect on the American auto industry. Think 
about what it was during its heyday of the 1940s, '50s and '60s, 
the number of jobs it provided, the wealth it produced. Then, 
consider its current plight, the seemingly endless downward spiral 
of an industry in disarray and decline, thrashing about in pursuit 
of desperate solutions such as the mass exodus to low-wage 
manufacturing sites and the frequently botched and ill-conceived 
introduction of super-automation. 
While there are many factors that have contributed to the rolling 
disaster that is the U.S. auto industry, the key element has been 
Detroit's standing failure to produce well-designed, competitively 
priced, high quality smaller vehicles. For decades, the domestic 
manufacturers arrogantly assumed that the public would buy 
whatever they decided to make. Since larger cars were more 
profitable, that's what they produced. Instead of worrying about 
improving their product, the auto companies concentrated on 
corporate gamesmanship, financial manipulation, and short-term 
bottom-line strategies, all calculated to impress not the buying 
customers but the real gods of corporate America, Wall Street. 
Largely as a result of such mismanagement, the auto industry 
is faced with the continued onslaught of imported vehicles from 
Japan, Korea and elsewhere; steadily declining market share; 
hundreds of thousands of jobs almost certainly lost forever; 
suppliers threatened with extinction by outsourcing to foreign 
manufacturers; and entire communities impoverished and 
abandoned. 
There is, however, a footnote to this sad story that bears 
examination. Long ago the United Auto Workers (UAW) and its 
president, Walter Reuther, had an inkling of the ultimate peril 
embodied in the auto companies' attitude toward price and 
product. During the first round of negotiations between the union 
and GM in 1946, the Autoworkers demanded a 30% wage increase, 
but linked that with a demand that the company not raise its prices 
commensurately. GM negotiators were apoplectic, arguing that 
it was impossible not to raise prices in lockstep with any wage 
increase. Reuther then made his famous "open the books" 
proposal. 
"We are prepared," Reuther told GM negotiators, "to settle this 
demand for less than 30%, provided you can disprove our 
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contention that wages can be increased 30% without increasing 
prices, and you can still make a profit. If you can prove that we 
can't get 30%, hold prices, and still make a nice profit, we will 
settle for less than 30%." Reuther was clearly willing to link wages 
to profits, but only if the company opened its books and agreed 
to pursue a strategy that he believed would result in higher sales 
volumes, which would thus offset the smaller profit made on each 
car. 
GM's response was both revealing and ultimately tragic for the 
workers and communities who eventually paid the price for the 
industry's arrogance. Howard Cohen, the company's assistant 
director of personnel, told Reuther: "Why don't you get down to 
your size and get down to the type of job you're supposed to be 
doing as a trade union leader . . . It's none of your damn business 
what GM does about prices." 
The Autoworkers continued to try and convince GM to produce 
a smaller, less expensive car. The UAW went so far as having its 
research department draw up detailed plans for such a vehicle. 
Although this proposal was never seriously considered by the 
company the union persisted for years in arguing the need to make 
a compact car. Such a car, it argued, would be irresistible to a huge 
number of potential customers with modest incomes—customers 
who would otherwise be forced to settle for cheaper, but less 
reliable and more-expensive-to-operate used cars. These were the 
customers who, in a few short years, began flocking in droves to 
purchase Volkswagens and then Japanese vehicles. 
With hindsight, it is easy enough to speculate what might have 
been had the UAW held out for price restraint and for the 
manufacture of a truly competitive small car. It certainly would 
have established a quite different role for the union in dealing with 
the auto manufacturers. Realistically, given the circumstances that 
prevailed at the time, it probably wasn't possible to negotiate what 
would have amounted to a direct union role in corporate decision-
making. But this chapter of labor history may prove instructive 
in looking at the challenges now facing workers and unions in this 
country. 
Public PLUS "Private" Strategies 
It should be abundantly clear to anyone who cares about our 
economic future that "business" is far too important to leave to 
corporate executives and Wall Street financiers. Workers and their 
communities bear the brunt of corporate greed and mismanage-
ment, but their substantial "investment" in an enterprise is rarely 
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represented, or even reflected, when the most crucial business 
judgments are made. The challenge today is to come up with a 
workable strategy that will permit workers and communities to 
exert their influence over corporate decision-making. 
It seems to me that there must be two separate, but related, 
elements to such a strategy. One, clearly, involves public action 
on the political level. The other, however, will be "private/' in that 
workers, unions, and communities must begin to act on their own 
to protect their interests and to help shape the business decisions 
of private companies. 
Over the past decade, there has been much discussion of the 
need for a national industrial policy to effectively address the 
economic problems confronting this country. There can be no 
argument that many of the most important solutions to our 
economic woes can only be dealt with politically and on a national 
level. These public approaches include laws governing taxation, 
labor relations, business practices, industry-wide regulation, and 
financial manipulation, as well as programs designed to increase 
employment, provide workers with useful skills, and rebuild our 
economic infrastructure. 
But while the orgy of corporate greed and profligacy that has 
characterized the Reagan years may at last lead Congress to curtail 
some business "excesses," it seems unlikely that any form of broad 
new industrial policy will emerge any time soon. Even with the 
new Democratic Congress, the trend toward less government 
involvement in the economy will likely continue for some time. 
In truth, I believe, our own vision of workable economic 
alternatives is still quite blurred. But it does seem clear that the 
process of creating a new consensus for an equitable national 
economic policy will require years of building from the bottom 
up. While broad policy proposals and sweeping legislative models 
are useful, many of the elements of a new economic and industrial 
policy will have to emerge from the practical experiences of 
workers and communities as they struggle to cope with sweeping 
and often devastating change. These will be incremental 
experiences, often revolving around individual firms, with much 
experimentation—and certainly many failures. But this 
evolutionary process is what we need in order to develop the 
building blocks for a workable national strategy. 
One of the critical weaknesses we have is our failure to come 
to grips with the reality of a market economy, and to sufficiently 
understand, much less become actively involved with, such basic 
business issues as corporate structure, finance, and operations. 
It is precisely to this area that workers, unions, and communities 
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Steelworkers on picket line at Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Co. during 
1985 strike that ousted W-P's top management. (See story, page 63.) 
must now turn in order to develop realistic alternatives to 
destructive corporate policies. This is the "private" component 
of the effort to make economic institutions accountable to those 
who depend on them. 
In contrast to most countries in the world, both government and 
unions in the U.S. have historically accepted a remarkably limited 
definition of their legitimate role with respect to business 
decisions. Yes, government at various levels imposes regulations, 
some quite stringent. And yes, unions negotiate with employers 
over wages, hours, and working conditions. But the fact remains 
that neither government nor labor organizations have really made 
it their business to play a major, direct role in the development 
of long-range corporate plans or in day-to-day operational 
decisions. 
Although it may attempt to influence corporate behavior with 
incentives and penalties, the public sector has for the most part 
assiduously avoided "interfering" with "private" business 
decisions. And, Democrats and Republicans alike, seem 
unanimous in their opposition to government competition with 
private enterprise (witness the strong support for the sale of 
Conrail). 
Likewise, unions and labor activists of all tendencies and 
persuasions are nearly unanimous on one point: they don't want 
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to become the "boss" or put themselves in the position to make 
decisions that fundamentally belong to the employer. Certainly, 
unions have struggled for decades to push back management rights 
in many areas, but this is still far from involvement in decisions 
about investments, prices, profits and the product itself. 
As a result, we are left without a legacy of experience with or 
thorough understanding of how fundamental business considerations 
can be altered to provide workers with job security and decent 
wages, and give communities a stable economic base. Thus, we 
must begin to define for ourselves what a "good" business would 
really look like, how it should behave (not just broadly, but in 
minute detail), and how it should be run. 
In this era of capital mobility, job-destroying corporate takeovers, 
mismanagement, technological transformation, and structural 
economic change, if the basic role of unions is to promote the 
economic well-being and security of workers, then they must gain 
a much broader role in corporate operations and a much stronger 
voice in fundamental business decisions. Otherwise, employers 
will always be able to undermine any gains workers make simply 
by moving away from or replacing them—to say nothing of their 
ability to resist worker demands in the first place. 
This is why workers, unions, and communities need to develop 
tools to begin organizing economic resources and to pursue a 
comprehensive capital strategy. 
Capital Strategies 
To many, capital strategies mean "corporate campaigns," pension 
power, and worker ownership. While these are clearly important 
elements or tools in what I define as a capital strategy, I would 
offer a much broader definition: A capital strategy is an integrated 
approach to trying to affect all aspects of the structure, finance, 
and operations of both single employers and entire industries. 
If, as I have argued, we need to develop broad new strategies 
to deal with the entire range of corporate affairs, what would the 
elements of such an approach entail? 
There are a number of ways to categorize capital strategies, 
although none really fit neatly into a single category. For instance, 
some are primarily designed to exert external pressure on an 
employer for a specific purpose, while others are played out 
internally, usually in the context of collective bargaining and union 
representation of the workforce. 
Examples of external strategies would include corporate or 
coordinated campaigns to force an employer to deal fairly with 
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its workers and their union—as the Amalgamated Clothing & 
Textile Workers (ACTWU) did at J.P. Stevens and a coalition of 
unions coordinated by the AFL-CIO's Food & Allied Service Trades 
Department did at Beverly Enterprises—or to influence the 
outcome of corporate takeover maneuvers—as the Rubber Workers 
did at Goodyear and the United Food & Commercial Workers have 
done at Safeway. 
Other examples of external strategies include campaigns to 
involve communities and state and local governments in efforts 
to convince companies to maintain, modernize, or expand their 
facilities. This could entail enlisting local businesses, churches and 
other institutions to pressure the employer, or it could mean 
getting state or local governments to make economic development 
resources available. (See story on the United Electrical Workers 
local at Stewart-Warner on page 103.) 
Some examples of internal strategies would be negotiated 
production agreements, specifying in some detail what a company 
will produce and how many people it will employ in the process, 
or agreements providing for stock ownership, access to corporate 
information, or the right of first refusal to purchase a company 
if it is to be sold. The growing use by building trades unions of 
pension funds to finance union-built construction projects is 
another type of internal capital strategy. 
The recent UAW strike at GM-Delco was a good example of an 
internal strategy because the strike was, in large part, over the 
company's plan to move some 2,000 jobs to Mexico. This job action 
was as effective as it was because the union understood that, with 
its new "just-in-time" production technique, GM could be shut 
down in very short order since it no longer maintained a large 
inventory of parts for the final assembly lines. 
There are other ways of classifying capital strategies. Some could 
be viewed as essentially defensive—attempts to protect what you 
have gained in the past—while others involve going on the 
offensive to secure new rights and create additional jobs. For 
example, most partial or total worker buyouts begin as moves to 
save jobs. On the other hand, many corporate campaigns are 
designed to provide workers with something new, a union. A 
hybrid defensive and offensive approach might be a concerted 
union drive to expose corporate mismanagement and resulting 
inefficiencies. The purpose of such an effort would be both to 
protect existing jobs and wage levels, and to build the case for 
expanded employment or improved wages and benefits. 
Below are brief discussions of various capital strategies and the 
tools that go with them. Most of these approaches are in tr^eir 
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infancy; none have really been thoroughly tested and developed. 
But I believe we have gained enough experience to at least glimpse 
the broad outlines of a comprehensive set of tools for economic 
organizing and capital strategies. 
Industry and Company Strategic Analysis 
Too often, individual unions and communities are forced to try 
their hand at analyzing an entire industry in order to understand 
the situation of an individual employer. Although some interna-
tional unions have excellent research departments, they are 
terribly over-extended and have their hands full just dealing with 
specific collective bargaining situations. 
Unions need to begin pooling their resources to systematically 
perform in-depth analyses of industries—collecting and evaluating 
information on company finances, competition, market share, 
technological change and so forth. This type of information is 
vitally required at the top to allow union leaders to develop 
industry-wide policies, and at the base, to permit local officers and 
members to better evaluate the status of their company. 
An integral part of such an effort should be an early warning 
system that would flag companies which are demonstrably falling 
behind their competition, which are evolving new strategies, or 
which are likely to become caught up on one side or another of 
a takeover battle. 
Another grievous problem is the labor movement's lack of access 
to the skills, mechanisms, and institutions needed to pursue 
important capital strategies. Not surprisingly, most people with 
experience in areas of corporate finance and operations are 
working on the other side of the fence. While there are people 
in unions who are skilled in these areas, there are simply too few 
of them. Experience has shown, however, that many union 
activists have the potential to develop top notch skills even in areas 
as arcane as corporate indenture agreements and cost accounting. 
All they need is the training and the opportunity. In one situation 
of which I am aware, the union chief steward, in six months 
became more of an expert about more aspects of a company's 
operations than were any of its executives. 
In addition, mechanisms that could theoretically be constructed 
to help unions in any number of ways, are simply not being 
developed by the traditional financial institutions. Unions, for 
example, need better research on companies' employment trends 
and policies. This is the kind of information that could logically 
be provided by securities research firms, which generate massive 
amounts of data about other aspects of company operations. There 
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are also many types of financial mechanisms that, if created, could 
help unions and communities preserve jobs. To date, very few have 
actually been put together. 
In addition, more needs to be done to help unions analyze 
proposed buyouts and takeovers, and intervene where necessary. 
Also, while there are now a number of "labor-oriented" invest-
ment banking firms, more need to be created. Further, we need 
to develop ideas about what such an institution should be and 
what standards it should meet. 
Negotiated Production Agreements 
A central union goal in any "internal" capital strategy should 
be some form of production agreement. Such an agreement 
should, to the greatest extent possible, include detailed language 
on as many operational issues as possible—from capital invest-
ment plans to volume levels, employment stipulations, and 
product development and quality issues. 
Many times during collective bargaining, promises are made 
about various business plans or strategies. Often, these represen-
tations are used by unions to develop their own strategies. These 
promises and projections should be made integral and enforceable 
parts of the contract; if a business issue is important enough to 
become part of the bargaining process, it should be codified in 
the agreement. 
Beyond operational and production issues, unions should 
negotiate for two key provisions: unlimited and on-going access 
to corporate financial information, and the right of first refusal 
to purchase a company (or other similar agreement that would 
force a potential buyer to deal with the union). The first provision 
needs no elaboration. The second is important because it can give 
a union leverage with potential new owners. Beyond the right of 
first refusal, another interesting approach could be workers' 
"poison pills," which permit them to trigger some sort of penalty 
if they are not satisfied with the terms of a transfer in ownership 
or control. 
ESOPS and Worker Ownership 
Many Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) are a rip-off, 
and worker ownership will not solve the problems of the American 
economy. Even so, these can be valuable tools in struggles to 
preserve jobs. Beyond their well-known uses in wages-for-stock 
agreements, ESOPs have the potential of becoming a powerful 
weapon of last resort against companies that seem intent on 
destroying workers' standard of living and their unions. 
40 Labor Research Review 
The broad "experiment" of the unions at Eastern Airlines— 
which included minority worker ownership, union representation 
of the board of directors, and joint productivity efforts—has been 
criticized by some as having been doomed from the beginning by 
an immutably recalcitrant management. The real problem at 
Eastern, in my opinion, was not that the unions there attempted 
something that couldn't have worked. Rather, they erred in not 
going far enough, fast enough to make sure that Eastern executives 
couldn't do what they ultimately succeeded in doing. 
In late 1986 the Eastern unions tried to use an ESOP to stop 
the company from being sold to Frank Lorenzo's Texas Air Corp. 
This attempt, after Eastern had already agreed to be purchased 
by Texas Air, was simply too late. It is now clear that by late 1985, 
or very early 1986, the unions should have launched a "hostile" 
takeover effort, possibly in partnership with another airline or 
investor. But the prospect of launching a hostile takeover against 
an employer is obviously not an easy one to contemplate. While 
the unions were trying to deal with management in some more 
traditional ways, Lorenzo launched his preemptive strike. When 
the unions were finally able to line up the financing for a takeover, 
Texas Air already controlled the majority of Eastern's stock. 
The key mechanism to the failed takeover attempt at Eastern 
was an ESOP, which can actually be created by unions through 
a newly established corporation. Under the law, ESOPs can 
borrow money, and a growing number of financial institutions are 
willing to lend money to them for the purposes of buying 
companies. Even though the unions were trying to launch a buyout 
after Texas Air effectively controlled Eastern, they were able to 
secure financial commitments for their transaction. In retrospect, 
it seems clear that such an effort, launched prior to the Texas Air 
bid, would have been, in the words of one investment banker, "a 
slam dunk." 
There are now at least a couple of other situations brewing 
where a hostile, union-inspired ESOP buyout could become a 
reality. This is potentially a very powerful tool in dealing with the 
management of many publicly traded companies. 
Alternative Capital Pools 
"If you can't beat 'em, buy 'em" ought to be the password of 
the labor movement. Unions have negotiated for pension funds 
which are now worth more than a trillion dollars. Although 
employers control the majority of these funds (another negotiating 
goal!), unions and union members exercise substantial control over 
hundreds of billions of dollars in jointly controlled private sector 
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Bus mechanic at Metro Dade Transportation Administration, where 
Transport Workers Local 291 campaigned against mismanagement 
of the Miami transit system. (See story, page 47.). 
S plans and public employee plans. 
Unfortunately, almost all pension assets are managed by 
I professional investment advisors who are only interested in the 
• standard stock-and-bond crap shoot. Beyond that, there really isn't 
that much of a choice at this point. The building trades have 
I succeeded in spurring the creation of several pooled funds to 
I finance union construction, and several other pooled investment 
! funds are either in operation or on the drawing boards, but much 
i remains to be done. For instance, pools could be created, like 
1
 mutual funds, with the express purpose of investing in and lending 
to union-supported buyout efforts. Regional economic 
development pools could be created (one is actually operating in 
Pennsylvania). If properly done, these pools could provide pension 
plans and other sources of capital with a reasonable return on their 
I 
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money. And they would give union pension trustees an alternative 
to point to when pressuring money managers to change their 
investment practices. 
Beyond pension funds, there are real possibilities of creating 
alternative IRA and 401(k) pools for individual investments. Also, 
state governments should be pressed to invest public monies 
(temporary funds, severance tax pools, endowments, and so forth) 
much more creatively. 
State & Regional Economic Development Strategies 
While the development of a national industrial policy seems 
years away, it is much more realistic to begin working towards 
more worker-oriented state and regional economic development 
policies and strategies, a key priority of which should be the 
creation of high-wage, high value-added jobs. 
Today, a number of states provide money for feasibility studies, 
and are willing to work with communities and unions in efforts 
to save facilities and convince employers to modernize or expand 
plants. In some places, public officials are becoming desperate 
enough to be willing to side with a union in bitter fights with 
employers over the closing of a plant or large-scale lay-offs. 
A state, or even a sizable city, can bring substantial resources 
and pressure to bear. They often have large amounts of money 
available for economic development, and unions and communities 
should become more involved in organizing those resources. 
In addition, state university systems and economic development 
agencies should be pushed to work with unions and communities 
in creating decent, lasting jobs. 
Two-Way Information Flows 
An important problem that plagues many capital strategies is 
the lack of good two-way information flows between the member-
ship and union leaders. In corporate campaigns, members and 
even local officers sometimes feel they are in the dark about what 
is actually being done, what the strategies are, and what the 
chances of success might be. Where unions have gained access 
to confidential employer data, they often run into a range of 
constraints (legal and strategic) that prevent them from disclosing 
key information to the membership. Clearly, something must be 
done about this. 
Although there are no easy answers, at the very least any union 
caught in this situation should re-double its efforts to make sure 
that members are provided with all the public information about 
the situation that is available. For more sensitive information, 
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unions have always been able to use the informal grapevine to 
convey their message. This is clearly a situation where creative 
use of the grapevine could be invaluable. 
On the other side of the information flow, unions with access 
to in-depth information from a company should make a priority 
of tapping the wealth of data in the hands of line workers. Usually, 
unions are being given access to corporate information because 
of some crisis or impending confrontation. The key issues at hand 
are almost always already well-known on the shopfloor, and union 
leader^ should check whatever representations an employer makes 
with observations from line workers. 
New Organizing Approaches 
There are some obvious uses for capital strategies in organizing 
campaigns, but there are a couple of less obvious ones as well. 
Increasingly, unions are using external financial and shareholder 
pressure on employers. In the process, they are becoming quite 
adept at performing strategic analyses of corporate strengths and 
weaknesses. Unions are enlisting pension funds and other capital 
sources in quite innovative ways. One union has successfully used 
letters from trustees of union-related pension funds that are 
stockholders of a company during organizing campaigns; the 
letters encourage workers to vote for the union and express the 
hope that management will obey the law and be cooperative once 
the union is certified. This approach has seemed to blunt employer 
arguments that "investors" wouldn't like it if workers voted for 
a union, and would desert the company, leading to all sorts of 
calamities. 
One less obvious use of in-depth industry analyses is to help 
union organizers better understand how to reach employees of 
relatively prosperous, traditionally non-union companies. This 
actually works on several levels. First, many successfully non-
union companies have carefully cultivated an all-encompassing 
corporate "culture" which influences the way workers see 
themselves with respect to their jobs and their employers. 
Organizers need to learn how to speak the language of a corporate 
culture and then relate or contrast the union's goals with those 
espoused by the company. 
On another level, an in-depth analysis of a company and its 
industry can permit union organizers and supporters to become 
trusted authorities on the company. Many companies aren't 
particularly quick at passing on important information to 
employees. Often, a union, having kept on top of its research, can 
provide workers with the facts before a supervisor can. Often it 
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can provide facts that management doesn't want known. 
In 1985, for example, ACTWU was able to help block a manage-
ment-proposed $400 million "leveraged buyout" at Scott-Fetzer 
(a leveraged buyout is where a company is purchased with 
borrowed money with repayment to come from the acquired 
firm's assets and profits). ACTWU became involved when one of 
the company's subsidiaries inserted a key element of the buyout 
into an organizing campaign, telling workers that if they voted for 
the union they wouldn't be able to participate in an ESOP that 
was being created to help finance the deal. In this case, the union 
was able to convince the Labor Department that the ESOP was 
in fact a massive rip-off, since the ESOP would have ended up 
paying more than ten times the price for the company's stock than 
key management personnel would have and since management 
was getting more than enough money to pay for their stock from 
golden parachutes that were triggered by the deal itself! Because 
the ESOP was crucial to the financing of the entire transaction, 
the deal fell apart after the Labor Department intervened. 
Conclusion 
In order to realistically embark on a capital strategy, we must 
come to grips with the essential reality of a market economy where 
there is competition between firms, with some succeeding and 
others failing. In this economy workers by definition compete 
against each other, even in plentiful times where industry-wide 
pattern agreements are the rule, not the exception. The key to 
ameliorating the effects of this competition lies in the creation of 
a diversified, growing, and rational economy, combined with 
meaningful programs to assist workers in troubled companies. 
For that reason, unions must make it their business to help 
directly in the creation of jobs at the firm, industry and national 
levels. This means dealing with everything from business plans 
and investment decisions to daily operational issues and marketing 
strategies. 
Obviously, there are risks in this approach. But these risks 
should be carefully balanced against the risks of not making the 
effort to alter the corporate decision-making process. In the long 
run, workers have to be concerned with the entire range of issues 
surrounding the operations of their employer: price, product, 
planning, investments, control, quality, and, yes, profits. • 
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Harold Crooks, Dirty Business: The Inside Story of the New 
Garbage Agglomerates, Lorimer & Co., 1983. 
Underwritten by the Canadian Union of Public Employees 
(CUPE), exposes the record of privatization and contracting out in 
the garbage collection industry. Other materials on CUPE's fight 
against contracting out of public services are available from CUPE, 
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by Encyclopedia Britannica (800-554-6970). 
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Robert Hayes and William Abernathy, "Managing Our Way to 
Economic Decline," Harvard Business Review, July-August 1980. 
Seminal article which launched much of the current debate on 
American mismanagement. 
Robert Hayes, "Managing as if Tomorrow Mattered," Harvard 
Business Review, May-June 1982. 
Partially technical, but worthwhile explanation of how 'discounted 
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3-3-86. 
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